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1Moral Hazard and Non-Exclusive Contracts 1
ABSTRACT
This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard (hidden
action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium is determined by the
interaction of ﬁnancial intermediaries.
The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is that intermediaries are
restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: the agents’ contractual relationships with
competing intermediaries cannot be monitored (or are not contractible upon).
We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In this set-up equi-
librium allocations are clearly incentive constrained ineﬃcient. A robust property of
equilibria with non-exclusivity is that the contracts issued in equilibrium do not imple-
ment the optimal action. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts do
implement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive proﬁts and equilibrium al-
locations are third best ineﬃcient (where the deﬁnition of third best eﬃciency accounts
for constraints which capture the non-exclusivity of contracts).
1This is amuch revised version of ea rly work conta ined in aDelta -Crest Working Pa per with the
title ‘Financial Markets, Asymmetric Information and Growth’, and in Bisin-Guaitoli (1995). Thanks
to Richard Arnott, Gary Becker, Peter Diamond, Jose’ Scheinkman, Robert Townsend as well as Daron
Acemoglu, Alberto Bennardo, Pierre Andre’ Chiappori, Roger Guesnerie, Jim Peck, and seminar
audiences at many universities. Financial support from the HCM program of the EEC, the Spanish
DGICYT program and the C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics is gratefully acknowledged.
21 Introduction
Models of contracts with asymmetric information are usually models of exclusive con-
tractual relationships. In other words, it is assumed that a party in a contract can en-
forceably restrict the other party’s participation to contractual relationships with other
agents2. As a consequence agents cannot undo the incentive eﬀects of one contract by
engaging in additional contractual relationships with other agents or institutions. In
terms of informational requirements, exclusive contracts eﬀectively require that the in-
stitutions which design the contracts are able to perfectly monitor agents’ trading with
other institutions. Also, courts can enforce exclusive contracts only if agents’ trades
are observable and veriﬁable, which requires a rich institutional setting to allow courts
to centralize information about trades.
Enforceability of exclusive contracts is a strong assumption, and while it is a very
useful benchmark3, there are many interesting economic environments in which exclu-
sive contracts are not easily enforceable.
For instance, in economies with relevant interactions of formal and informal sectors,
the informal ﬁnancial markets (often represented by institutions like family links and
private money-lenders) are not easily monitored by, and do not easily monitor, for-
mal markets like banks and government institutions. That informational constraints
severely limit the enforceability of exclusive credit relationships in developing economies
has been documented for instance by Aleem (1990) for Pakistan, and Siamwalla et al.
(1990) for Thailand. Relatedly, the success of various microﬁnance programs like the
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (cf. e.g. Murdoch (1997)) is often explained in terms of
their ability to partially relax the informational constraints on exclusivity by means of
extensive monitoring.4
Also, ‘monitoring technologies’ are often quite costly or are regulated in insurance
and credit markets, and as a consequence exclusive contracts are not enforced. For
instance, small business in the U.S. often have multiple credit sources (Petersen-Rajan
(1994)); agents often hold several credit cards (Bizer-De Marzo (1992)); debt covenants
in ﬁnancial contracts rarely include exclusivity clauses (Smith-Warner (1979)); the
regulatory limits on enforcement of contracts with no collateral might explain the
2Cf. e.g. the survey of contract theory by Hart-Holmstrom (1987). Even general equilibrium
analysis of economies with asymmetric information rely heavily on exclusivity assumptions: cf.
e.g. Prescott-Townsend (1984), Townsend (1987) for theoretical foundations, and Townsend (1994),
Atkinson-Lucas (1992) for more applied analysis.
3And a natural one e.g. in markets like the automobile insurance market, where the insurers can
eﬀectively monitor the contractual relationships of the insuree with other insurance companies.
4Cf. e.g. Mc Kinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), and more recently Bencivenga-Smith (1991), Greenwood-
Jovanovic (1990), Hoﬀ-Stiglitz (1997) for theoretical analysis of the interaction of formal and informal
ﬁnancial markets in developing economies.
3thinness of the commercial credit markets in Italy 5 (Guiso-Jappelli-Terlizzese (1991).
Finally, economies of scope substantially limit the design of exclusive contracts.
For instance government agencies which provide social security or unemployment in-
surance programs cannot easily monitor private savings without also trading a rich
array of ﬁnancial instruments.6 Similarly, car insurance companies cannot monitor
gasoline purchases by insurees without also setting up gas stations; ﬁrms often can-
not monitor either managers’ wealth, when designing their compensation schemes, or
workers’ wealth when setting wages7; credit institutions cannot easily monitor trade
credit; and so on.
In this paper we depart from the analysis of exclusive contractual relationships,
and study equilibria of economies with asymmetric information in which contracts are
restricted to be non-exclusive. This is done in a simple general equilibrium environ-
ment. We deﬁne equilibrium with non-exclusivity as requiring i) agents to take the
set of contracts available for trade in ﬁnancial markets as well as prices as given, and
ii) ﬁnancial intermediaries to choose strategically the set of contracts they issue by
rationally anticipating the agents’ equilibrium choices for any possible set of contracts.
We concentrate on economies with moral hazard in the form of hidden action. These
economies have been used to study credit markets as well as insurance markets, and
many other contractual relationships. Agents choose a costly eﬀort, e.g. to put in an
investment activity. Eﬀort is agents’ private information, and aﬀects the probability
distribution of the investment’s outcome. Financial intermediaries issue contracts to
insure agents on their outcome realization without being able to condition on the eﬀort.
We analyze the simplest case in which eﬀort is discrete (‘high’ or ‘low’), although the
results can qualitatively be extended to the continuous eﬀort case.
For this class of economies we are able to characterize equilibria with non-exclusivity.
We show that in equilibrium the ‘low’ eﬀort might be implemented even if both the in-
centive constrained optimal contract and autarchy (i.e. when no contract is traded) can
implement the ‘high’ eﬀort. These equilibria occur because of the intermediaries’ incen-
tive to fully insure agents conditionally on their undertaking the ‘low’ eﬀort whenever
other intermediaries provide insurance conditionally on their undertaking the ‘high’
eﬀort (i.e. at more favorable terms for the agents). As a consequence ‘high’ eﬀort
can only be sustained (if at all) as an equilibrium when contracts can be designed to
prevent entry of other contracts which adversely aﬀect incentives for the incumbents.
Analyzing the conditions under which the ‘high’ eﬀort is implemented and the kind
of contracts which sustain these equilibria, we show that they generally involve inter-
5Cf. e.g. Bertini (1967) for an institutional analysis of the regulation of credit contracts with no
collateral in Italy.
6Cf. Diamond-Mirlees (1996), Kotlikoﬀ-Spivak (1981).
7This might partially explain why managers’ wages are relatively ﬂat with respect to their ﬁrm’s
market value; cf. Gibbons (1997).
4mediaries making positive proﬁts, and require issuing ‘latent’ contracts, i.e. contracts
which are not traded in equilibrium, but act as barriers to entry when marketed.
‘Latent’ contracts, while serving the purpose of restricting entry of contracts with
negative incentive eﬀects on the incumbent contracts, also inevitably act to guarantee
rents in equilibrium to the intermediaries issuing the incumbent contracts which sup-
port the agents’ ‘high’ eﬀort. In general we can then prove that, because of the rents of
intermediaries, equilibrium allocations which support agents’ high eﬀort are third best
ineﬃcient. In other words, if a planner could operate transfers across agents (transfers
which can of course only be contingent on observables) before markets open, then the
tranfer could be chosen so that in equilibrium all agents would be better oﬀ.
1.1 Related Literature
The analysis of moral hazard economies characterized by non-exclusivity has been pi-
oneered by R. Arnott and J. Stiglitz in a sequence of unpublished papers in the early
80’s (their work is now collected in Arnott-Stiglitz (1993)) and by the enlightening
comments on their work by Hellwig (1983).8 Our paper is mostly related to this line
of work. We study basically the same class of economies as Arnott-Stiglitz (1993) and
Hellwig (1983), but we allow for a larger strategy space of intermediaries (containing
‘negative insurance’ contracts; i.e. insurance contracts which pay in the high endow-
ment state). It turns out that this generalization simpliﬁes substantially the analysis
and the classiﬁcation of equilibria with non-exclusivity. In particular this allows us to
study in detail the welfare properties of equilibrium allocations.
Kahn-Mookherjee (1997) also analyzes eﬃciency of equilibria with non-exclusivity
in a hidden action environment. The structure of the game intermediaries and agents
play in their model is quite diﬀerent though from ours: e.g. in their model agents
design their own contracts (intermediaries just either accept or reject); also agents
make contractual decisions sequentially; and their contractual portfolios are observable,
even if not contractible upon. It turns out then that equilibrium allocations and welfare
properties for our economy are very diﬀerent from those of the Kahn-Mookherjee (1997)
economy. In particular, in our set-up allocations are robustly third best ineﬃcient.
Finally, Helpman-Laﬀont (1975) (cf. also Bisin-Gottardi (1997)) study competitive
equilibria in economies with hidden action. In their set-up linearity of prices captures
a strong form of non-exclusivity: each intermediary has no control over agents’ trades,
not even over trades of his own contracts. In the set-up of the present paper instead
intermediaries control agents’ trades in the contracts they themselves issue.9
8But cf. also Bizer-de Marzo (1992), Helpman-Laﬀont (1975), Jaynes (1978), Pauly (1968). The
analysis of equilibria with non-exclusivity is also related to the analysis of ‘common agency’ (i.e.
agency with many principals) in the contract theory literature; cf. e.g. Bernheim-Whinston (1986).
9As aconsequence, while athird best ineﬃciency result for competitive equilibriawith linea r prices
52 The Economy
The economy lasts two periods, t ∈{ 0,1}. It is populated by a continuum of ex-ante
identical agents, indexed by i ∈ I with total measure 1, and by a large ﬁnite number
of ﬁnancial intermediaries, indexed by h ∈ H.
Agents choose in t = 0 an eﬀort which is private information, and which can take
two values, e ∈{ a,b}. Agents are risk averse; they have preferences which value
consumption in period 1 only, and eﬀort e: u(c)−v(e). We assume that u : + →is
twice diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, strongly concave and limc→0 u(c)=−∞.W e
also assume without loss of generality that v(a) >v (b).
Agent i’s endowment at t = 1 is a random variable wi which is i.i.d. across agents
i ∈ I, and whose realization is publicly observable (from now on drop the apex i to
save on notation). The random variable w takes values wH, wL,w i t hwH >w L.
Eﬀort aﬀects the probability distribution of the endowments: let πa (resp. πb)
denote the probability of endowment wH given eﬀort a (resp. b). Assume πa >π b.
The reader will have noticed that H (resp. a) takes the interpretation of the ‘high
endowment state’ (resp. ‘high eﬀort’).
Remark 1 As standard in moral hazard environments, we use the properties oflarge
economies. In particular, the Law ofLarge Numbers allows us to identif y πe with
the fraction of agents which observe the realization wH when producing eﬀort e (cf.
Al-Najjar (1995)).
Prior to the beginning of time, intermediaries strategically design contracts. Each
intermediary h can design and issue Jh contracts, and J is the set of contracts issued
overall. A contract prescribes a set of transfers from the intermediary to the buyer
(possibly negative) conditionally on publicly observable variables. Formally, a contract




L) representing the payoﬀ respectively in state H and L.
Note that contracts only pay oﬀ in period 1 (since agents only consume in period 1).
Let dh =( dj)Jh
j=1 denote the set of contracts issued by intermediary h. Intermediaries
maximize proﬁts.10
2.1 Equilibrium and Optimality
We can now start constructing the equilibrium deﬁnition we shall use in this paper:
equilibrium with non-exclusivity. Given the set of contracts issued by intermediaries,
agents choose which contracts to buy. This determines their consumption allocations.
Agents also choose eﬀort. Anticipating the choices of agents, as a function of the set of
is proved by Bisin-Gottardi (1997), the result in this paper is much stronger.
10More general hidden action economies share the same properties. In particular the results can be
extended to economies with continuous eﬀort choice and any ﬁnite number of states of uncertainty.
6contracts they are allowed to trade, intermediaries strategically choose which contracts
they issue, to maximize proﬁts. We will restrict for the sake of notation the analysis
to symmetric equilibria (in which all agents behave identically).11
The problem solved by agents can be formally described as follows. Each agent
chooses eﬀort e ∈{ a,b}, dichotomous portfolio choices λ = {λj}j∈J ∈{ 0,1}J,a n d
consumption c =( cH,c L), to maximize:
E [u(c) − v(e) | e]( 1 )
subject to





The term E[. | e] denotes the expectation over w given e ∈{ a,b}. Note that agents
can either buy or not buy a contract (i.e. λj ∈{ 0,1}); they cannot e.g. buy just a
fraction, although they can buy multiples if the same contract is issued by multiple
intermediaries. This reﬂects our modelling of non-exclusivity as a form of inability of
each intermediary to observe agents’ trades with other intermediaries.
The problem solved by intermediaries can be described as follows. Intermediary











e,λ solve (1)-(2), (d
h
)h=h given (4)
Note that intermediaries eﬀectively play a simultaneous game by choosing the structure
of contracts they trade.
Deﬁnition 1 (Equilibrium) An equilibrium with non-exclusivity is an array
<e ,λ ,c ,(d
h)h∈H >
such that
i) <e ,λ ,c>maximize (1) subject to (2) given d =( dh)h∈H;
ii) dh maximizes (3) subject to (4), given (dh)h=h for any h ∈ H.
11Symmetric equilibriamight not in genera l exist in this cla ss of economies due to non-convexities
in the agents’ choice set.
12We implicitely assume that intermediaries have large enough endowments to avoid bankruptcy
issues. Note also that they do not need to be risk averse: proﬁts in fact are deterministic because of
the Law of Large Numbers; the conditional expectation in equation (3) should not mislead the reader.
7This deﬁnition of equilibrium (with a strategic component in the intermediaries’
choices) has been used in diﬀerent contexts by Rotschild-Stiglitz (1976), Arnott-Stiglitz
(1993) and many others (cf. also Mas Colell (1982)).
We can now introduce the deﬁnitions of Pareto optimum, incentive constrained
optimum,a n dthird best optimum.
At the Pareto optimum a planner chooses agents’ eﬀort and the set of contracts to
be traded to maximize agents’ utility subject to the deﬁnition of consumption (equation
(2)) and the zero proﬁts constraint on intermediaries (equation (5)).13
Deﬁnition 2 (Pareto Optimum) The Pareto optimum,o rﬁrst best,i sa na r r a y
<e ,λ ,c ,(d
h)h∈H >









λj =0 ( 5 )
At the incentive constrained optimum a planner chooses agents’ eﬀort and the set
of contracts to be traded to maximize agents’ utility subject to the deﬁnition of con-
sumption, the zero proﬁts constraint on intermediaries (equation (5)), and the incentive
compatibility constraint (equation (6)).
Deﬁnition 3 (Incentive Constrained Optimum) The incentive constrained opti-
mum is an array
<e ,λ ,c ,(d
h)h∈H >
which maximizes (1) subject to: equation (2), equation (5) and
λ,e solve (1)-(2) given (d)h∈H (6)
Remark 2 It is easy to show that by imposing zero proﬁts on intermediaries, we es-
sentially pick the particular point on the incentive constrained frontier which would be
decentralized by competitive equilibria if exclusive contracts were allowed; see Prescott-
Townsend (1984). In this case in fact
i) competition in the contract design implies that only one type ofcontract is issued at
the equilibrium: dj = dj, ∀j ∈ J; while
13Both here and in the deﬁnition of Incentive Constrained Optimum, next, we directly impose zero
proﬁts rather than non-negative proﬁts. Bennardo-Chiappori (1998) prove that this is (only) justiﬁed
in economies, like ours, in which eﬀort enters separably in agents’ preferences. We will show instead
that at the Third Best Optimum proﬁts might turn out to be positive; cf. the proof of Proposition 6.
8ii) price competition drives proﬁts to zero for all j ∈ J: E [dj | e]λj =0
Since non-exclusivity introduces restrictions in the intermediaries’ problem (in addi-
tion to incentive compatibility), it is natural and interesting to deﬁne and characterize
a ‘third best’ optimum in which the planner also faces these restrictions. In partic-
ular, following e.g. Guesnerie (1995), we assume that the planner chooses transfers,
τ =( τh,τ L), prior to markets opening but anticipating the equilibrium with non-
exclusivity which will occur from endowments w + τ. Transfers are naturally required
to be ‘self-sustainable’, i.e. to have a zero (or negative) expected value (equation (7)).
Deﬁnition 4 (Third Best Optimum) The third best optimum is an array
<e,λ,c,(d
h)h∈H,τ >
which maximizes (1) subject to:
e,λ,c,(dh)h∈H are an equilibrium with non-exclusivity for an economy with endow-
ments w + τ, and
E[τ | e] ≤ 0( 7 )
3 Characterization
We are now ready for the characterization of equilibria with non-exclusivity and the
ineﬃciencies associated with this equilibrium concept.14
The following proposition shows that, except in the trivial case in which it coincides
with the Pareto optimum, the incentive constrained optimum cannot be decentralized
by an equilibrium with non-exclusivity.
Proposition 1 Suppose dic is the incentive constrained optimal contract. Suppose also
that the incentive constrained optimum does not coincide with the Pareto optimum.




L} such that, if dj = dic,a n db o t hdj and dj





Figure 1 illustrates graphically the proof of this proposition. w is the endowment
point; (1 − πe)/πe is the fair price (the slope of the zero proﬁt line) conditional on
eﬀort e ∈{ a,b}; ue is the indiﬀerence curve with eﬀort e, drawn so that ua and ub have
the same expected utility; cic is the incentive constrained optimum allocation. Since
(1 − πb)/πb > (1 − πa)/πa, the marginal rate of substitution at any cH,c L is higher on
ub than on ua. Any point in the shaded area can be reached from cic with a contract
making positive proﬁts and is preferred by agents to cic. This proves that cic cannot
be an equilibrium with non-exclusivity.
14All proofs are collected in the Appendix.
9<Fi g u r e1 >
Leaving the simple analytic details of the proof to the reader, it is interesting to
characterize the contract dj which makes positive proﬁts when coupled with the incen-
tive constrained optimal contract. Since agents when buying only {dj} in equilibrium
are indiﬀerent between e = a and e = b (Lemma 1 in the Appendix), there exists a
contract {dj} with the following properties:
• d
j
L > 0, d
j
H < 0, and πbd
j
H +( 1− πb)d
j
L = − (small enough),
• agents prefer dj + dj
to dj.
The ﬁrst property states that contract dj
oﬀers positive insurance and makes proﬁts
 (i.e. the price of the insurance is less than fair for the agents). The second property
guarantees that agents nonetheless prefer to buy the combination of contracts dj and
dj
rather than the incentive constrained optimal contract dj byi t s e l f .
As a consequence, if both ˜ d = {dj,d j} are issued, agents choose eﬀort e = b, the
intermediary issuing dj makes negative proﬁts, while the one issuing dj makes positive
proﬁts.
We are now able to provide a characterization of equilibria with non-exclusivity. We
will ﬁrst derive conditions under which equilibria implement the low eﬀort (Proposition
2). We will then show that whenever equilibria with non-exclusivity implement the high
eﬀort, then the set of contracts issued in equilibrium has a particular form: contracts
are issued which operate as a barrier to entry (Proposition 3) and generally guarantee
positive proﬁts to intermediaries (since these contracts turn out not to be traded in
equilibrium they are called latent contracts, following Hellwig’s terminology).
The special case in which agents have logarithmic preferences can be worked out
in closed form to provide examples of equilibria both with low and high eﬀort, for
diﬀerent parametrizations of the cost of eﬀort v(e) (Proposition 4). In particular, we
can show that equilibria with low eﬀort arise robustly also for economies in which, if
agents traded the incentive constrained optimal contract or if they traded no contracts
at all, they would deliver the high eﬀort (Proposition 5).
Proposition 2 Deﬁne K = v(a) − v(b).I f
πau(cH)+( 1− πa)u(cL) − u(πbcH +( 1− πb)cL) − K<0( 8 )
for all (cL,c H) ≥ 0 such that




   
cH − wH
cL − wL




then there exists a unique equilibrium allocation with non-exclusivity characterized by:
cH = cL = πbwH +( 1− πb)wL and e = b.
10We call these equilibria low eﬀort equilibria, represented graphically by point cb in
Figure 2. The set of points deﬁned by (9)-(10) is the area between the two (zero proﬁt)
lines from the endowment. Condition (8) means that from any consumption point in
(9)-(10) agents strictly prefer to buy additional insurance at the price15 (1−πb)/πb and
choose eﬀort b rather than stay at that point with eﬀort a (as illustrated in Figure 2:
agents prefer point B rather than A.) In this case no allocation with high eﬀort can
be a equilibrium with non-exclusivity, because any other intermediary could make a
positive proﬁt on a contract selling insurance at a price slightly higher than (1−πb)/πb.
On the other hand, insurance contracts at the price (1−πb)/πb can never make losses.
As a consequence contracts d = {dj}j∈J sustaining low eﬀort equilibrium allocations
satisfy full insurance conditional on eﬀort b, and zero proﬁts for all contracts issued
(i.e. πbd
j
H +( 1− πb)d
j
L =0 ) .
<Fi g u r e2 >
Proposition 3 If(8) is not satisﬁed at some point in (9)-(10), then any equilibrium
allocation in pure strategies satisﬁes (9)-(10) and
πau(cH)+( 1− πa)u(cL) − u(πbcH +( 1− πb)cL) − K =0 ( 1 1 )
with e = a.
We call these equilibria high eﬀort equilibria, an example of which is indicated by
point ca in Figure 3. Condition (11) guarantees that at the high eﬀort equilibrium
allocation agents are as well oﬀ as they would be buying the optimal level of additional
insurance at price (1−πb)/πb and switching to e = b. A set of contracts selling insurance
at price (1−πb)/πb is oﬀered (they never make losses), but since agents are indiﬀerent
by construction we can assume that nobody enters them in equilibrium (that is why
they are called latent contracts). Latent contracts operate as a barrier to entry with
respect to any other contract which oﬀers insurance at a price lower than (1−πb)/πb. In
case such a contract is oﬀered, agents will in fact have the incentive to buy it together
with all other contracts oﬀered (including the latent contracts) and will switch to e = b,
thereby inﬂicting losses not only on all the incumbents which oﬀer contracts at price
less than (1 − πb)/πb, but on the entrants as well.
Since latent contracts operate as a barrier to entry, positive proﬁts for intermediaries
are possible in high eﬀort equilibria. Positive proﬁts are in fact always associated to
high eﬀort equilibria, under some regularity condition (cf. proof of Proposition 2A in
the Appendix). An equilibrium will have a certain number n of intermediaries selling
each a fraction 1/n of the aggregate insurance |c − w|, with agents being indiﬀerent







11between buying from all the n ﬁrms or from n−1 only (the indiﬀerence curve cuts twice
the price line from w to c). This ‘local satiation’ prevents ﬁrms active in equilibrium
from deviating and charging a higher price for their fraction of insurance. There can
be many equilibria with diﬀerent numbers of active ﬁrms: in the limit as n goes to
inﬁnity ca becomes a tangency point.
<Fi g u r e3 >
A formal characterization of necessary conditions for high eﬀort equilibria in terms
of both allocations and contracts is contained in Proposition 2A in the Appendix.16 We
can also prove that, whenever conditions (8)-(10) are not satisﬁed, and a high eﬀort
equilibrium does not exist, mixed strategy equilibria do exist (cf. the Appendix). We
have not attempted to characterize mixed strategy equilibria.
We concentrate instead on the case in which agents have logarithmic utility. In
this case there always exist an equilibrium in pure strategies. Moreover, explicit condi-
tions in terms of parameter values can be obtained under which there exist low eﬀort
equilibria only.
Proposition 4 With u(.)=ln(.), there exists Kw such that low eﬀort equilibria exist
iﬀ v(a) − v(b) >K w. High eﬀort equilibria exist when this condition is not satis-
ﬁed; moreover high eﬀort equilibria support allocations (cH,c L) in (9)-(10) such that
cH/cL =ˆ α>1.17
The ineﬃciency associated with low eﬀort equilibria is even more striking since it
also occurs for economies such that
- the incentive constrained optimal contract d implements e = a,a n d
- whenever no contract at all is oﬀered, agents choose the high eﬀort e = a,
as is shown in the following proposition.




16An example for which high eﬀort equilibria exist is presented in Hellwig (1983). Arnott-Stiglitz
(1993) and Hellwig (1983) prove a series of propositions in the spirit of our Propositions 2 and 3.




L, ∀j ∈ J (i.e. contracts are restricted to provide positive insurance).
Besides the loss of generality, that assumption complicates the analysis substantially by enlarging the
set of equilibria. Hellwig (1983)’s existence example, however, does not require that restriction on the
strategy set of intermediaries, and hence satisﬁes our deﬁnition of equilibrium with non-exclusivity.
17In the proof of the proposition it is also shown that ˆ α is the minimum over the set of solutions
to the equation exp{−K}απa =( 1− πb)+πbα. With log utility, the points satisfying (11) lie on two
lines from the origin, as drawn in Figure 3.
12i) equilibria are low eﬀort (hence they implement e = b);
ii) at the constrained optimum allocation e = a;
iii) ifno contract is oﬀered, agents choose e = a.
Remark 3 It is clear from the proof that Proposition 5 does not strictly require loga-
rithmic preferences: any suﬃciently small perturbation of preferences around logs would
do.
Finally we are ready to study third best eﬃciency. Suppose that the planner chooses
transfers to agents knowing that, at the new endowments determined by the transfers,
agents will trade up to an equilibrium with non-exclusivity. Is the planner able to
improve agents’ expected utility? This is the question our analysis of third best eﬃ-
ciency asks. The answer is in general yes for economies with high eﬀort equilibria. No
Pareto improving transfers are on the contrary possible for economies with low eﬀort
equilibria.
It is easy to give an intuition for this result, based on the characterization of high
eﬀort equilibria developed to this point. Proposition 3 shows that high eﬀort equilibria
are supported by ‘latent’ contracts. These contracts form a barrier to entry. From
the eﬃciency point of view, ‘latent’ contracts have two eﬀects. On the positive side,
they endogenously restrict entry of contracts which provide a negative externality on
the incentives of the incumbent contracts which support the ‘high’ eﬀort. On the
negative side ‘latent’ contracts, acting as a barrier to entry in general, limit the scope
of competition across intermediaries. This negative eﬀect manifests itself obviously as
positive proﬁts of intermediaries in equilibrium. While ‘latent’ contracts play the role
of restricting entry also at the third best allocation, the planner’s transfers can always
be chosen so that intermediaries are not able to extract any rent from agents trading
after having received the transfers.
Proposition 6 Low eﬀort equilibria are third best eﬃcient. High eﬀort equilibria are
third best ineﬃcient for a generic set of parameters.
We give here a sketch of the proof of Proposition 6, with the help of Figure 3,
because it is quite instructive. Roughly, the proof shows that the third best eﬃcient
allocation naturally implies zero proﬁt for the intermediaries, while at equilibrium
proﬁts are positive because ‘latent’ contracts endogenously generate a barrier to entry.
The details of the proof are in the Appendix.
Sketch of the proof. Any low eﬀort equilibrium is third best eﬃcient. In fact, if




   <
1−πb
πb , the equilibrium with
non-exclusivity after the transfer will have agents choose e = b. As a consequence the




   =
1−πb
πb has no
eﬀect on the equilibrium after the transfer.
Suppose now that (8)-(10) are not satisﬁed. Let us ﬁrst characterize the third
best eﬃcient allocation ctb =( ctb
H,c tb
L) with high eﬀort. The resource constraint (7) for
transfers and non-negative proﬁts for intermediaries require




   
cH − wH
cL − wL
    (10)
Graphically (see Figure 3), ctb is restricted to be on or below the high eﬀort zero proﬁt
line (the other inequality previously in (10) is not binding here). The crucial step is
to note that to guarantee feasibility of the planner’s transfers (equation (7)), ctb must
be such that, at the equilibrium allocation which will be reached after the transfers,
the agents choose the high eﬀort; this implies that ctb must satisfy
πau(cH)+( 1− πa)u(cL) − u(πbcH +( 1− πb)cL) − K ≥ 0( 1 2 )
The third best allocation ctb will then be a point maximizing agents’ expected utility
s.t. (9), (10), and (12). In fact at the third best allocation (12) will be satisﬁed with
equality (which is equation (11) above). As a consequence, ctb will be either a point of
intersection of (11) with the zero proﬁt line (as in the log example shown in Figure 3,
where the lower branch of (11) is a line with positive slope) or a point below the zero
proﬁt line with the indiﬀerence curve tangent to (11) (in cases where (11) might bend
backward). We consider here only the ﬁrst case, as represented in Figure 3, and refer
to the Appendix for the complete case, in which possibly positive proﬁts arise at the
third best (in this case the same intuition holds in the modiﬁed sense that the high
eﬀort equilibrium displays higher proﬁts for intermediaries than the third best).
We can now show that a point of intersection of (11) with the zero proﬁt line, as ctb,
cannot be an equilibrium with non-exclusivity. To be an equilibrium for some number
of active ﬁrms n, the indiﬀerence curve should cut the line twice, at ctb = w + d and
at w + n−1
n d, or in the limit with n →∞be tangent (Prop. 3). But with eﬀort e = a,
indiﬀerence curves have a slope (1−πa)/πa at full insurance and a steeper slope in the
region of underinsurance. In this region, then, they can only cut the zero proﬁt line
once from above. Therefore ctb cannot be supported as a high eﬀort equilibrium.
Remark 4 The assumption that the planner can set transfer before markets open, in
the deﬁnition ofthird best optimum, is not essential. A similar ineﬃciency results
could be derived ifwe simply had the planner choose contracts simultaneously with
intermediaries provided the planner ofcourse maximizes agents’ pref erences.
144C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We have shown in a hidden action model that non-exclusivity of contractual arrange-
ments has possibly dramatic eﬀects on the contracts traded in equilibrium and on the
equilibrium allocations and action. In particular for an open set of economies the op-
timal action is not implemented in equilibrium, and for the economies in which it is
implemented, some intermediaries make positive proﬁts and allocations are third best
ineﬃcient.
Similar ineﬃciencies due to non-exclusivity of contracts arise also in diﬀerent asym-
metric information economies (cf. Bisin-Guaitoli (1995)). For instance in the hidden
information insurance economies studied by Townsend (1982), no insurance contract
is traded at the equilibrium with non-exclusivity, even though insurance contracts are
sustained at the incentive constrained optimum.
Also, in the information extraction economy studied by Ma (1988), the information
which can be extracted from agents at the equilibrium with non-exclusivity is very lim-
ited, even though information is fully extracted at the incentive constrained optimum
(thereby sustaining ﬁrst best allocations).
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17Appendix 1: Existence
We ﬁrst sketch here a proof of existence in mixed strategies for completeness. The
proof follows the lines of Bisin (1998).
The agents’ optimal choice in problem 1-2) is described by a mapping from {dh}h∈H
into (e,λ,c). Let this mapping be denoted ψ. Then clearly, under the assumptions on
preferences, ψ is upper-hemi-continuous.
We can now restrict the set of feasible contracts, without loss of generality as follows:
d
j
L ∈ [−wL,+wL], d
j
H ∈ [−wH,+wH], ∀j ∈ J. The strategy space of the game played
by intermediaries is then compact, and their payoﬀ function is a continuous function
of (e,λ,c). Intermediaries rationally anticipate the map ψ of {dh}h∈H into (e,λ,c). In
fact, because there is a continuum of agents i ∈ I, intermediaries rationally anticipate
the convex hull of ψ (cf. Bisin (1998)). Intermediaries’ proﬁts are then eﬀectively
an upper-hemi-continuous convex valued correspondence, since they are a continuous
function of ψ. The main theorem in Simon-Zame (1990) allows ﬁnally to show that,
for some selection of the intermediaries’ proﬁt correspondence, a Nash equilibrium in
mixed strategies of the game exists. ♦
Appendix 2: Proofs
Let c(u) denote the inverse of preferences u(c).
Lemma 1 The incentive constrained optimum allocation with eﬀort e = a for any
agent i ∈ I is a solution ofthe f ollowing (dual) problem:
{uH,u L} = argmin πac(uH)+( 1− πa)c(uL)
s.t. πauH +( 1− πa)uL − v(a) ≥ U
πauH +( 1− πa)uL − v(a) ≥ πbuH +( 1− πb)uL − v(b).
Ifa solution exists f or given U ≥ πau(wH)+( 1− πa)u(wL) − v(a), then both the
participation constraint and the incentive constraints are binding.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .The ﬁrst order conditions for uH and uL are
πac
(uH)+λπa + µ(πa − πb)=0
(1 − πa)c
(uL)+λ(1 − πa) − µ(πa − πb)=0
where λ and µ are the multipliers for the participation and the incentive constraints.







18Suppose by contradiction that the incentive constraint is not binding: then µ =0
implies c(uL)=c(uH), hence uH = uL (full insurance), which is not incentive com-
patible (since v(a) >v (b)). Now suppose the participation constraint is not binding:
with λ = 0 the ﬁrst order condition becomes
µ(πa − πb)=−πac
(uH)
which does not have a solution (since µ>0). ♦
The following Proposition 2A collects in a more precise form the statements of Propo-
sitions 2 and 3 in the text. In this Appendix we prove directly Proposition 2A (cf. also
Figures 2 and 3).
Let Pj be the proﬁts made by the intermediary who issues contract j (out of contract
j only).
Proposition 2A For the hidden action model there exist equilibria with non-exclusivity
characterized as follows:
1. if
πau(cH)+( 1− πa)u(cL) − u(πbcH +( 1− πb)cL) − K<0, (8)

















1a) cH = cL = πbwH +( 1− πb)wL and e = b are the unique equilibrium allo-
cations and eﬀort choice; the equilibrium contracts d = {dj}j∈J sustaining
this allocation and eﬀort satisfy:
1b) πbd
j
H +( 1− πb)d
j
L =0 , ∀j ∈ J; moreover
1c) Pj =0 , ∀j ∈ J;
2. if(8) is not satisﬁed at some point in (9)-(10), then
2a) any pure strategy equilibrium allocation (cH,c L) satisﬁes (9)-(10) and
πau(cH)+( 1− πa)u(cL) − u(πbcH +( 1− πb)cL) − K =0 ( 1 1 )
with e = a; moreover the equilibrium contracts d = {dj}j∈J sustaining this
allocation and eﬀort satisfy:
192b) ∃J1 ⊂ J and n such that:
πad
j
1H +( 1− πa)d
j




n |c − w|), ∀j ∈ J1;
πbd
j
2H +( 1− πb)d
j
2L =0 , ∀j ∈ J2 = J − J1;





> 0 if 1−πa
πa <





   
=0 if 1−πa
πa =





   
, ∀j ∈ J1.
2d) if 1−πa
πa =





    there may also be equilibria with properties 1a-c); more-
over an equilibrium in mixed strategies exists whenever equilibria 2a-c) fail
to exist.
Proof of Proposition 2A. Equilibria are characterized in terms of aggregate
allocation (there may be many equilibria of the game that diﬀer only for the allocation
of sales and proﬁts among individual ﬁrms, but imply the same eﬀort and consumption
allocation for agents, as well as the same aggregate sales and proﬁts). Deﬁne c =
(cL,c H)a n dU(c,e)=πeu(cH)+( 1− πe)u(cL) − v(e).
Step 1. Trivially any equilibrium allocation must satisfy (9)-(10) (outside that region
either proﬁts are negative or there is always room for another proﬁtable contract).
Consider the allocations (cL,c H) satisfying








+( 1− πb)u(cL + ˆ d) − v(b),
where








+( 1− πb)u(cL + d)}.
By concavity ˆ d implies full insurance (conditioned on eﬀort b); substituting we obtain
condition (8). No such allocation can be sustained as an equilibrium because, for
some small positive , d s.t. πbd
H +( 1− πb)d
L = − is a strict best reply to any d
sustaining (cL,c H). Only allocations 1a) (full insurance with low eﬀort) can be sustained
in equilibrium, since d s.t. i) πbd
H+(1−πb)d
L = 0 and ii) d
L ≥ 0 (‘positive insurance’),




L| =( 1− πb)/πb, for any J.
Step 2. If (8) is violated at some points in (9)-(10), there exists a non-empty set of
allocations (cL,c H) for which (11) is satisﬁed (by continuity, since (8) is always satisﬁed
when cL = cH). No allocation with high eﬀort for which the left-hand side of (11) is
negative (as in (8)) can be a equilibrium (from Step 1). Suppose the left-hand side of
(11) is strictly positive at the allocation (cL,c H) sustained by contracts d = {dj}j∈J
s.t.






20In the region of underinsurance the marginal rate of substitution is greater than the








if cL <c H.
Then there is always another proﬁtable contract d s.t. U(c + d,a) >U (c,a)a n d
U(c + d,a) >U (c + d,b) (compare (11) with the incentive constraint in Lemma 1).
However the allocation (cL,c H)c o u l dbes u s t a i n e dbyas e to fc o n t r a c t s d including not
only those needed to reach the consumption point, i.e. {d
j
1}j∈J1 s.t.





1s, s = H,L,









and if U(c + d,a) >U(c,a), then






2,b) >U(c + d
,a).
Here the following Lemma applies.
Lemma 2 The set ofcontracts sustaining an equilibrium with e = a must include
‘latent’ contracts {d
j
2}j∈J2 s.t. λj =0 , ∀j ∈ J2; moreover any latent contract must
satisfy πbd
j
2H +( 1− πb)d
j
2L =0 , ∀j ∈ J2.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .If no latent contracts are issued, for any proposed allocation c
there always exists another proﬁtable contract: see Prop. 1 for points on the incentive
constrained frontier and Step 2 above for other points. Suppose latent contracts provide




2L| < (1 − πb)/πb, for any j ∈ J2. Agents will
be indiﬀerent between the candidate equilibrium allocation c with high eﬀort a and





2, which will be in the region of overinsurance (where the marginal rate of
substitution with low eﬀort is less than (1−πb)/πb). But then there exists a contract d
selling negative insurance (i.e. d
L < 0,d 
H > 0) with |d2H/d2L| < |d
H/d
L| < (1−πb)/πb,
such that U(ˆ c+d,b) >U(ˆ c,b)=U(c,a) (agents strictly prefer the low eﬀort allocation
with latent contracts and the negative insurance). Also, by the deﬁnition of equilibrium,
this is better than adding the negative insurance to c with high eﬀort, i.e. U(ˆ c+d,b) >
U(c+d,a). If such a contract is introduced, agents will then buy all the contracts and
21choose low eﬀort. Any contract selling positive insurance with a slope less than (1 −
πb)/πb will make losses, but d being the negative of such a contract will make positive
proﬁts. A proﬁtable deviation exists, then, for any candidate equilibrium supported
by latent contracts at a price less than (1 − πb)/πb. The only equilibrium contracts





for any j ∈ J2, since in this case no negative insurance contract d with |d
H/d
L| <
(1−πb)/πb can improve upon the point of tangency of the low eﬀort indiﬀerence curve
with the latent at full insurance. ♦
Any equilibrium allocation sustained by latent contracts (according to Lemma 2) by
deﬁnition must satisfy (11): more precisely, it must belong to the subset of (11) made of
points c s.t. cL >c 
L for any c in (11) with πbc
H+(1−πb)c
L = πbcH+(1−πb)cL. Latent
contracts deter entry, but also ﬁrms that are active in equilibrium must be prevented
from deviating and charging a higher price for their part of the aggregate insurance. If
U(c,a) >U(c − dj,a)f o rs o m ej ∈ J1, there is some contract dj (with a higher price)
which is more proﬁtable than dj. The equilibrium requires U(c,a)=U(c − dj,a)f o r
all j ∈ J1 : with n ﬁrms selling, this ‘local satiation’ implies d
j
1 = 1
n |c − w|;i s o p r o ﬁ t
lines have a slope (1 − πa)/πa, less steep than the indiﬀerence curve, so no deviation
is proﬁtable. Such equilibria exist e.g. when the utility of consumption takes the form
u(c)=cγ/γ, γ < 0o ru(c)=l nc (as proved by Hellwig (1983)).18 If no equilibrium in
pure strategies exists, however, we can prove that an equilibrium in mixed strategies
always exists (cf. Appendix 1). To complete the proof of 2d), suppose the equilibrium
allocation c with the property stated in 2d) (with all contracts making zero proﬁts) is
the only point satisfying (9)-(10) and (11). Weak best replies to {d
j
2}j∈J2 as in Lemma
2 are both other contracts of the same kind or contracts {d
j
1}j∈J1 s.t. c = w+d1. Hence
both type of equilibria may coexist. ♦












Denote α ≡ cH/cL. If K is suﬃciently small, the left hand side will have two inter-
sections ˆ α1 and ˆ α2 with the right hand side. Condition (8) is violated by points c s.t.
cH/cL ∈ [ˆ α1, ˆ α2]. The greater K, i.e. the marginal disutility of eﬀort, the closer ˆ α1 and
ˆ α2;f o rK equal to
K










18It can also be shown that equilibria which do not satisfy d
j
1 = 1
n |c − w|, ∀j ∈ J1, might exist only
for a set of economies for which (12) is not transversal to 0. This set of economies is non-generic, as
it can immediately be proved using perturbations of the parameter K.




(points at which the marginal rate of substitution conditioned on eﬀort a is equal to
(1 − πb)/πb). For K>K  (8) is satisﬁed by any c. A threshold Kw = K therefore is
always a suﬃcient condition, but it is really necessary only if (wH/wL) ≥
(1−πb)πa
(1−πa)πb (i.e.
if the endowment point lies to the left of the singular ˆ α). Otherwise it is suﬃcient (and
necessary) that the smaller ˆ α1 be greater than wH/wL (so no point satisfying (9) can
violate (8)). In this case take Kw = K <K , with K s.t. ˆ α1 = wH/wL. The rest
follows from Proof of Prop. 2A. ♦
Proof of Proposition 5. Deﬁne θ = wH/wL. With logarithmic preferences, for any
given (πa,π b) there exists an open set K>K , θ>θ  such that e = b at any equilib-
rium (from the proof of Proposition 4 with θ =
(1−πb)πa
(1−πa)πb). At the incentive constrained
optimum with e = a the incentive constraint is binding (Lemma 1): uH − uL = K
πa−πb,
i.e. cH =e x p { K
πa−πb}cL; substituting into the zero-proﬁt condition:
cL =
wL + πa(wH − wL)
1 − πa + πa exp{K/(πa − πb)}
.
Furthermore, with zero proﬁts the agents’ expected utility must be higher than the
maximum utility attainable with e = b, i.e.
πauH +( 1− πa)uL − v(a) ≥ u(πbwH +( 1− πb)wL) − v(b).





1 − πa + πa exp{K/(πa − πb)}
exp{πbK/(πa − πb)}
.
Since the left hand side is increasing in θ, for any given (πa,π b)a n dK>K  there
exists an open set θ>θ  such that e = a at any incentive constrained optimum allo-
cation. Hence there exists an open set K>K , θ>max(θ,θ) such that conditions i)
and ii) are satisﬁed. Finally, for θ>exp{K/(πa − πb)}, even if no contract is oﬀered,
e = a (i.e. iii) is satisﬁed), since the endowment point is in the interior of the incentive
constrained allocations. ♦
Proof of Proposition 6. Given the sketch in the text, it remains to prove that
ctb cannot be supported as an equilibrium with non-exclusivity even if ctb is below the
zero proﬁt line, with the indiﬀerence curve tangent to equation (11). This is the only
case remaining to consider, since i) (11) deﬁnes a diﬀerentiable manifold in any compact
23contained in 2
++,a n dii) the region (cH,c L) deﬁned by (12) is generically transversal
to 0 (trivially, by perturbing K). Hence the planning problem is characterized by the
tangency of an indiﬀerence curve with the manifold deﬁned by (11).
At any equilibrium with high eﬀort, the slope of the indiﬀerence curve is less than
(1−πb)/πb in absolute value. As a consequence, on the latent contract line with slope
(1 − πb)/πb through the equilibrium, there lie allocations which provide less insurance
to the agent and which satisfy (12) strictly; i.e. allocations at which agents strictly
prefer not to buy the latent contracts. Hence (11) must have a slope steeper than
(1 − πb)/πb at the equilibrium and cannot be tangent to the indiﬀerence curve. This
directly implies that ctb cannot be supported as a high eﬀort equilibrium. ♦
24